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It is difficult to disagree with this conclusion although the
methods used to arrive at this conclusion are fertile grounds for
disagreement.
BROCK GRANT JR."
JURISPRUDENCE: READINGS AND CASES. MARK R. MAcGUIGAN.
University of Toronto Press. 1966. pp. 666 ($20.00)
This book is a revised and slightly enlarged edition of a multi-
lithed edition that was published in 1963. The new material is
composed partly of extra cases (there are now 34 reproduced as
opposed to 28) and a few more extracts rather than longer extracts.
Some of the longer extracts have been shortened to make way for
new material. The book contains five chapters and an appendix.
The first chapter is an introduction. Here the most important
case of the four reproduced is the case constructed by Professor
Fuller of Harvard, "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers". The
readings in this section include Holmes, "The Path of the Law" (and
other shorter extracts). The second chapter, "Positivism" begins with
extracts from four cases: Jacobs v. L.C.C.; Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland
Silicones; Magor and St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corporation; and
British Movietonews Ld. v. London and District Cinemas Ld. The
readings include the expected passages from Hobbes and Austin and
also extracts from Bentham ("The Principles of Morals and Legis-
lation" and "Principles of the Civil Code"), Gray, Kelsen, and Hart.
There is also an interesting short extract from Rawls, "Justice as
Fairness", and from Ross, "On Law and Justice". Chapter three,
Natural Law Thought contains parts of the judgment in D.P.P. v.
Shaw; Lochner v. N.Y.; and seven other cases. The readings contain
extracts not only from Aquinas and the modern Catholic natural
lawyers, but also from Fuller. There is also a very interesting extract
from a work by Margaret Mead, "Some Anthropological Considera-
tions Concerning Natural Law". Chapter four, Sociological Juris-
prudence includes parts of seven cases, including Donoghue v.
Stevenson, Fender v. Mildmay, and three cases on the meaning of
"good moral character" in the U.S. Nationality Act. The readings
include Savigny, Dewey, Pound and extracts from recent works on
sociological research. Chapter five, The Judicial Process, is concerned
with problems of precedent and the judicial function. The readings
in this chapter contain extracts from Dewey, Goodhart, Llewellyn,
Cardozo, Cohen, and Frank, and an article on jurimetrics. The
Appendix contains a note by the editor, an extract from McWhinney,
"Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in Canada" and a speech by
*Brock Grant, Jr., B.A. (Sir George Williams), is a member of the 1967
graduating class at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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Freedman J.A. (of the Manitoba Court of Appeal), on "Judges and
the Law". There are also about 25 "Notes" varying in length from
a paragraph to a page. They contain additional readings, cases and
sometimes problems as well as some comment by the editor.
The organization of a book such as this is inevitably a matter
of individual taste. Any book has to have some form and, within
a broad area, any arrangement is going to be generally satisfactory.
There is, however, something about the neat division into the four
headings of Positivism, Natural Law, Sociological Jurisprudence, and
Judicial Process that seems unhappy. The essential division of writers
would rather seem to be into those who are concerned with content
and those who are not. Thus those who are now classified as socio-
logical jurists, for example, can be regarded as being concerned with
examining the effect of law in society and are thus vitally concerned
with content. Those who are now included in Chapter five "The
Judicial Process", are, in general, less concerned with content than
with the problems of analysing the operation of the structure and
components of the legal system. This criticism may become clearer
if we consider the problem of classifying Fuller. Fuller has almost
nothing in common with the traditional Catholic Natural Law School.
It is true that he is concerned with morality, but not as an absolutist.
There are for him no necessary moral absolutes except those that
are required by the nature of man as he is. Support for this may be
found in the judgment of Foster J. in the "Case of the Contract
Signed on Book Day". (Fuller: Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 71.)
This is, of course, subject to the problem of identifying Foster J. and
Fuller. But if a positivist is one who is preoccupied with the structure
of law then Fuller is not a positivist. He is a Natural Lawyer only
if that classification includes those who are concerned with the con-
tent of the law. The division then can be made by asking what is
each jurist or writer trying to do. Is he trying to identify the legal
structure in any society? Is he trying to analyse the content of laws
and to see how that content satisfies any test he may devise for it?
Though this division will not solve all problems of classification, it
does seem more meaningful than the traditional classification.'
The real complaint then about the classification adopted in the
book is that it is archaic. This, however, is by no means a serious
defect. Anybody who agrees that there is a need for a new classifica-
tion has only to rearrange the materials to suit his convenience. The
much more important question is whether the editor has included all
that he should have. The inclusion of as many cases as there are has
great benefits for any teacher. Jurisprudence becomes much more
alive when it is presented in the form of concrete problems. There
are two cases that I would have liked to have seen included, both
constructed by Professor Fuller. The first is the "Case of the Contract
1 The adoption of the suggested classification may avoid the problem
the editor faced in deciding, for example, where to put the two articles of
the Hart-Fuller dispute: it represents the real dispute between the two
divisions.
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Signed on Book Day" (which would perhaps be accommodated at
the end of the chapter on Natural Law) and the second is the
"Problem of the Grudge Informer". (Fuller: "The Morality of Law",
p. 187.) This case could usefully be put at the very end of the book
as a review of any jurisprudence course. Fuller's third case the "Case
of the Interrupted Whambler" (Fuller: Problems of Jurisprudence,
p. 628), has no place in this book which does not present any materials
on the analysis of legal conceptions. The constructed case is much
better able to raise the really knotty problems of jurisprudence, and
these two might well have been permitted to accompany their more
illustrious brother: "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers".
There are also some minor omissions that might be mentioned.
The third chapter, Natural Law Thought, contains in just over three
pages, a short extract from Blackstone's Commentaries. (Section 2
of the Introduction.) The extract reproduces about seven pages of
the 23 in the whole section. One of the most interesting passages in
Blackstone is his statement that there is no moral obligation to
obey laws that merely enact maZa prohibita, (pp. 57, 58 of Editions
1 to 5). The passage loses none of its interest in later editions when
Blackstone altered it to try and escape the criticism heaped upon
it by Bentham, among others. (See, for example, p. 58, of Black-
stone's text, in Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
William Draper Lewis (ed.), 1897, Philadelphia, Rees, Walsh and
Company.) It almost seems a pity that all of this section of The
Commentaries could not be included, but then, of course, it would
be essential to include something from Bentham's wonderfully vitri-
olic "A Fragment on Government". It might also be observed in
passing, that there is much of Bentham (particularly in the "Frag-
ment"), more illustrative of his positivism, and more properly
classifiable as such, than the extracts that have been included.
Generally speaking, the editor has managed to include much of
the recent writings on jurisprudence. There are, however, one or two
points where I feel that some of the more interesting modern material
is insufficiently represented. For example, I think that "The Concept
of Law", by Professor H. L. A. Hart, warranted more than four
pages and a note by the editor. Hart's development of the Rule of
Recognition places him squarely in the same tradition as Austin and
Kelsen (and marks him as one primarily concerned with the structure
of law.) I am not sure that Professor MacGuigan was wrong to have
omitted the Hart-Devlin controversy. (He does refer to it in a
note on p. 251 after Shaw v. D.P.P.) This controversy does raise
some interesting points, but would probably take up more space
than would be justified. Certainly a short reference is better than
a very short extract which only whets the appetite.
One omission that cannot be regarded as serious, but which
might be rectified in any subsequent edition, is the failure to provide
references to extracts when they appear in the body of the book. At
the very beginning there is a complete list of acknowledgements
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which contains references to all the readings, but this is not quite
adequate. It is often necessary to refer to passages just preceding or
just succeeding the quoted passages and then it is extremely helpful
to have references to the pages at which the quoted passage starts.
This is particularly the case with extracts from lengthy books or
articles. It is especially useful with modern authors for then the
edition of the work reproduced will frequently be the same as that
possessed by the reader. Similarily it would be extremely useful to
know not only where a quoted passage is to be found but also if
the quotation is continuous and hence where each paragraph quoted
(if the paragraphs are not continuous), may be found.
Only two misprints that should have been caught by the proof-
reader were noticed and that was Keson for Kelsen, on page x of
the acknowledgements, and St. MeZlens for St. Mellons on page xiii.
This book easily meets the most critical test. It is as complete
as could reasonably be desired, given the space limitations imposed
by the need to be priced within the resources of students. The
extracts, by and large, are ample and there is sufficient variety to
give the subject depth. It should be extremely useful to any teacher
of jurisprudence and well worth its purchase price to students.
Perhaps it may be permissible to express the hope that in any
subsequent edition we may see more comments by the editor, for,
more than anything else, these provide the structure and coherence
which no arbitrary classification can ever achieve.
JOHN SWAN*
* Professor Swan, B.Comm., LL.B. (U.B.C.), B.C.L. (Oxford), Common-
wealth Scholar 1963-65, is an Associate Professor of Law at University of
Toronto Law School and Special Lecturer, Faculty of Forestry at University
of Toronto.
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